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 Social and socioeconomic interactions and transactions often require trust. In digital spaces, the main
approach to facilitating trust has effectively been to try to reduce or even remove the need for it through
the implementation of reputation systems. These generate metrics based on digital data such as ratings
and reviews submitted by users, interaction histories, and so on, that are intended to label individuals as
more or less reliable or trustworthy in a particular interaction context. We undertake a disclosive
archaeology (Introna, 2014) of typical reputation systems, identifying relevant figuration agencies
including affordances and prohibitions, (cyborg) identities, (cyborg) practices and discourses, in order to
examine their ethico-political agency. We suggest that conventional approaches to the design of such
systems are rooted in a capitalist, competitive paradigm, relying on methodological individualism, and
that the reputation technologies themselves thus embody and enact this paradigm within whatever space
they operate. We question whether the politics, ethics and philosophy that contribute to this paradigm
align with those of some of the contexts in which reputation systems are now being used, and suggest
that alternative approaches to the establishment of trust and reputation in digital spaces need to be
considered for alternative contexts.
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Introduction
Sociomaterial accounts of human-technology interactions raise important questions about the degree to
which technological systems and artefacts are imbued with agency (and hence morality) (Introna, 2014).
Whether one subscribes to inter-actional (Johnson, 2006) or post-human intra-actional (Barad, 2003;
Introna, 2014; Latour, 2005) accounts, the degree to which the design and features of technological
systems alter and even co-create new social practices and identities, and how we can sensitize ourselves
to such shapings, are important questions. In this paper, we address the question of how reputation
systems, as conventionally designed, co-constitute new versions of trust and identity in digital spaces.
Trust is a fundamental component of social relations. It helps actors make decisions in situations where
direct knowledge that can guide action and cooperation is not always immediately available. Trust helps
reduce complexity in social interactions, allowing actors to take decisions in situations which entail some
risk (Luhmann, 2017). Interactions in a digital environment are likely to require trust (Hsu, et al., 2007;
Usoro, et al., 2007) even more than those in a physical environment, as these interactions take place
between people and organizations that may be geographically and culturally distant. While trust is often
seen as a tri-partite relation between one individual (trustor) and another (trustee) in relation to an
object or outcome, it can also take a collective form in what is known as reputation, or how a community
or group of people view the trustworthiness of another person or entity.
Increases in the availability of digital data are having a significant impact on our opportunities to engage
in social interactions and the ways in which they are enacted. Increased digitization leads to increased
remote and mediated interactions. If we view humanity as a network: before the internet, interactions
tended to be between nodes that were previously only separated by a small distance; now the chances of
creating a new connection/entering into a transaction or relationship with a previously very distant node
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are much higher, and the chances of the different parties to a social or economic transaction being
physically co-located are much reduced (Shu and Chuang, 2011).
This has led to questions about how to establish trust in mediated interactions involving distant and/or
unfamiliar actors, when:
We do not know whether the person with whom we are interacting/transacting is who they say they
are.
We do not know whether they have the goods, skills or knowledge they claim to have.
We do not know whether their digital presence will persist, and so whether we will have any
continued relationship (and therefore a chance to reciprocate or for comeback.
We cannot rely on local knowledge and word-of-mouth from people we know and already trust
(reputation).
Such concerns may be increasingly important in a period of concern about “fake news” and the
manipulation of (social) media by various state and corporate actors.
One of the main ways in which online platforms have responded to this situation is through reputation
systems (Dellarocas, 2003; Jensen, et al., 2002; Resnick, et al., 2000). These are systems that collate
data in the form of feedback, ratings, and digital interaction/transaction histories, process them through
algorithms, and produce a synthetic and very often quantitative measure intended to give a guide to an
individual’s trustworthiness (Farmer and Glass, 2010).
In a context/mission creep mirroring that of other business-intelligence inspired data analytics (Wilson, et
al., 2017), such systems are becoming increasingly ubiquitous, no longer confined to the trading and
expert knowledge-sharing sites for which they were originally designed. Described by Masum and Zhang
(2004) as a ‘distributed court of opinion’ that will alleviate the strain on our overburdened ‘individual
processing capacity’ in the face of vastly increased accessible data and so ‘help the same number of hours
in the day go further’, great things are expected of them [1]. It has been suggested they could play
pivotal roles in the creation and maintenance of good governance, transparency and accountability in
public office and commerce, through either the creation of trust or even — paradoxically — the removal of
the need for it (Litos and Zindros, 2017; Masum and Tovey, 2011; Masum and Zhang, 2004; Picci, 2007).
But as they, or components such as ratings systems, permeate into perhaps unexpected digital spaces —
such as learning environments [2], community support groups (see, e.g., http://supportgroups.com) or
even online communities of criminals needing to trust each other in the exchange of services and goods
such as hacking and botnets (Décary-Hétu and Dupont, 2013; Dupont, et al., 2016) — and as China
moves to introduce a mandatory social credit system that incorporates elements of online reputation
systems (Botsman, 2017) and that attempts to reduce individuals to single measures of quality — we
need to ask questions about whether their design is commensurate with the intentions of the systems
they are being brought into.
One important question concerns the values that reputation systems embody and carry into the digital
spaces in which they are used. It is now fairly widely accepted in certain areas of research that
technology and technical artefacts (including information and communication technologies) are not
politically or morally neutral. Winner (1980) argued that artefacts, very much like people, have their own
politics which cause them to enact or contribute to particular types of ordered social system. He described
the now well-known example of the low bridges on roads to Long Island from New York. Winner noticed
that the low height of these bridges would exclude categories of people (those travelling on buses,
generally working class people or African Americans) from certain actions, such as accessing a middle-
class residential area. These low bridges thus embodied political decisions and enacted particular
discriminations and exclusions.
Going beyond politics that may be intentionally designed into technological artefacts, other authors have
suggested that the neutrality thesis concerning the morality of technology and technical artefacts,
including information and communication technologies, is untenable. For example, Van de Poel and Kroes
(2014) argue persuasively that technical artefacts may embody what they refer to as moral extrinsic final
values. By this they mean that the moral value or disvalue is associated with the artefact’s function and is
therefore relational or extrinsic (since the function must relate to other objects, people or states of
affairs) but is inherent to that function. The features and functionalities designed into digital technologies
shape the affordances, opportunities and limitations for action that users experience, and thus pattern
their potential behaviors, according to the values that the technologies embody. The Value Sensitive
Design movement (Friedman, et al., 2008; Johnson, 2006) has advocated designing artefacts and tools,
including digital technologies, with an explicit awareness of the values they embody or promote.
According to this community, ‘it is important that the values at stake are identified and analyzed carefully’
[3] during the design process. However, Introna (2014) suggests that technical artefacts not only
embody values, but also have a kind of agency (through which morality can be ascribed to them) that
goes beyond values that are (or may be) consciously designed into them. Introna’s position is grounded
in a sociomaterial perspective (Barad, 2003; Latour, 2005) that recognizes technical artefacts as nexuses
in complex networks of human and non-human, physical and digital actors that shape and are shaped by
political and social currents flowing within and through them.
In relation to reputation systems, an important question arises concerning the political and moral
decisions that these systems embody and carry into the digital spaces they operate in. In the following,
we draw on Introna’s (2014) call for a more disclosive approach to exploring the agency and ethics of
sociomaterial systems. By conducting a ‘disclosive archaeology’ [4] of typical reputation systems, we
suggest that conventional reputation systems are loaded with not just the values they are designed for
(trust, honest behavior, reliability), but also a more extended and subtle value-system: the political and
ethical paradigm of the competitive, capitalist free market based on self-interested individuals. Such
systems are underpinned by a view of reputation that implicitly (and sometimes even explicitly — see, for
example, Gandini [2016]) commoditizes it, positioning it as a capital that is inherent to individuals, who
can accumulate it, lose it and occasionally even speculate on it. This might be appropriate for a digital
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system that is intended to serve as a competitive market, for example an e-commerce Web site, or to
function within a platform capitalist model. However, this may not be the case in other contexts, where a
different political, ethical or philosophical paradigm underpins the construction or enactment of the digital
space.
In the following, we start by describing the main features of conventional reputation systems. We identify
some of the key ‘figuration agencies’ [5] that invest these systems with the capacity to shape interactions
and behavior patterns along certain ethico-political lines. We then examine various contexts in which such
systems, or parts of them, operate, including trading sites and expert question-and-answer (Q&A), and
show why we believe they embody and enact a fundamentally market-based, capitalist paradigm. Finally,
we examine other contexts in which they are used, including mutual cooperation platforms and supportive
discussion forums, and ask whether the properties and features of these systems are likely to encourage
the kinds of behaviors that participants and designers (and society at large) may wish for.
 
Trust and reputation systems in digital spaces
Common features of online reputation systems
Online reputation systems are systems that draw on data about a user’s activities to generate an
indication of that user’s standing within one or more online communities (Dellarocas, 2003; Jensen, et al.,
2002; Resnick, et al., 2000). In some ways similar to the points systems and leader-boards common to
online games, in which points are sought competitively and assigned by the game; the “capital” nature of
such points is made clear in those games that allow players to “spend” their points within the game-
world.
Reputation systems outside of games have a stronger focus on providing users with a metric on which to
base judgments about whether to trust other users or select them as partners for a transaction. They are
now default parts of the design of e-commerce sites, where items are bought and sold in conventional
financial transactions. They are also integral to the increasing number of sites based on a “gig”
(Friedman, 2014) or “sharing” (Hamari, et al., 2016) economic model. In the former, members offer their
skills and services for money but in a freelance capacity; in the latter, they provide or/and seek resources
such as tools, transport or accommodation without the exchange of money. In addition, many expert Q&A
sites (usually based on discussion forum rather than trading structures) employ reputation systems so
that users asking questions can judge whether or not to trust an answer, or community members can
build up their own reputation as experts (see, e.g., Movshovitz-Attias, et al., 2013). For participants in
these latter sites, high reputation scores may also be seen as badges of achievement or honor —
measures of kudos, as indicated by the name of the reputation scores in the online expert coder
community StackOverflow (Movshovitz-Attias, et al., 2013; Bosu, et al., 2013). The inclusion of
reputation systems in a digital space may thus also be seen as a form of gamification, providing
motivation to contribute more and higher quality postings or items in a knowledge-sharing community.
Reputation systems can base reputation measures on data from a range of sources, processed in a range
of ways (Costagliola, et al., 2014; Hendrikx, et al., 2015; Vavilis, et al., 2014). They may employ data
generated directly from a user’s activities, such as how many times they visit a site, how long they spend
on a site, how many transactions they complete, the ratio of completed to started transactions, how
many contributions they make to a discussion, how many network ties they have, and so on. They may
also draw on ratings of that user’s contributions/behavior provided by other users: for example, through
“likes,” up- and down-votes, ratings against particular reputation-items such as helpfulness, reliability,
promptness etc., or qualitative feedback in the form of text-based reviews. When reputation systems are
intended to support transactions of a trading nature (whether as part of the conventional, gig or sharing
economy), an entity’s reputation score might be based on customer feedback about reliability, product
quality, speed of response, etc. When they are intended to support expert discussion forums or interest
groups, reputation scores may be based on other users’ judgments of the quality of an individual’s
contributions to the site, number of contributions, and so on. In either case, reputation metrics are
intended to serve as proxies (Floridi, 2015) for prior experience and personal knowledge, on the basis of
which predictions of future interactions can be made.
Whichever factors are included in a reputation system, they are often used to generate a numerical
measure of the user’s overall behavior/reputation/ranking within the relevant community (despite Masum
and Zhang’s (2004) caution that ‘No person can be reduced to a single measure of “quality”’). Reputation
“scores” may be aggregates or averages; the data used to calculate these scores may be unweighted or
weighted according to a range of factors, including the reputation of the user submitting the ratings and
the age of the rating. Scores may be made public to other community members, so that they can make
decisions about how and with whom they interact; or they may be known only to the site administrators
(or an automated process) and used to make decisions about allowing or removing privileges within, and
even access to, services and users within the space. In the former case, they are visualized on the
interface of the service (e.g., using star-ratings or badges).
Reputation systems as agentic components of sociotechnical/sociomaterial assemblages
We believe that reputation systems cannot be considered as merely mechanical or technical artefacts that
can be separated from the social environments in which they operate. Instead, we take a perspective that
draws on the work of sociomaterial theorists such as Callon (1984), Latour (2005) and Delanda (2016).
That is, we conceptualize platforms or sites that facilitate digital interactions as sociotechnical
assemblages consisting of users, digital and physical infrastructure and resources, information and
practices. Such a conceptualization includes two key elements: an emphasis on the possibility of
emergent behaviors and effects such as ‘ideas, identities, rules, routines ...’ [6]; and a recognition that
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social or political agency is distributed within the assemblage, including artifacts, rather than inherent to
individual human actors (Latour, 2005).
A reputation system, in such a perspective, is an agentic component of the assemblage. It is, by design,
intended to induce or discourage particular behaviors amongst the users of the systems and platforms
they are part of. It explicitly acts to incentivize certain practices, from simply participating in the system
to behaving in ways that are deemed “good,” and limit or exclude others. As such, a reputation system is
imbued with some kind of agency (even if it is viewed as derived). Indeed, a reputation system may be
included in a platform precisely because of a recognition that ‘it takes effort to sustain stable networks of
relations’ [7] and reputation systems can be relied upon to constantly contribute to this effort.
Introna suggests that, since they allow and prohibit particular practices in support of particular sets of
values, technologies are ‘morally significant from that start’ [8]. However, it is also likely that such
agentic components of sociotechnical assemblages produce unintended consequences, for example
emerging patterns of behavior or social or emotional experiences among users, which are instead effects
of the assemblage as a whole. This, then, raises questions about where to locate moral agency within an
assemblage. While the sociomaterial, intra-actional view sees agency as distributed, it may also be
somewhat localized in particular components or clusters of components within an assemblage, in the form
of what Latour refers to as mediators; that is, actors that ‘make others do unexpected things’ [9]. Thus,
we might particularly associate certain agentic effects with reputation systems, since perhaps without
their inclusion in the assemblage these effects would not emerge or be brought into being. However, this
complex co-constitution of the politics and ethics of technology may mean sociotechnical assemblages are
‘not open to simple intervention and correction’ [10] through regulation of use or minor change to design,
but instead need to be constructed anew.
 
A disclosive archaeology of reputation systems
Introna (2014) suggests that a disclosive archaeology aimed at exploring the ethico-political agency of
sociotechnical systems can usefully start with the delineation of the system’s ‘figuration agencies’ [11].
He proposes four categories:
1. Affordances and prohibitions.
2. (Cyborg) Identities.
3. (Cyborg) Practices.
4. Discourses.
Here we adopt Introna’s use of the parenthetical adjective (cyborg) to indicate that, in the assemblage,
identities and practices are ‘hybrid[s] of machine and organism’ [12], rather than inherently human.
The outline of common reputation system features described above brings to light many of their
affordances and prohibitions. Users can buy, sell, award stars, write feedback, favorite, up- and down-
vote and so on — that is, they can pass public judgments of others. However, frequently, they cannot
defend themselves — they cannot explain why they had to, or chose to, do things the way they did. They
can also both accumulate and lose reputation, often spend it and sometimes even speculate on it.
To better understand affordances and prohibitions, and to uncover how reputation systems act within
platform assemblages to co-constitute both (cyborg) identities and practices, we examine the operation of
reputation systems in two contexts: trading/transactional states and expert Q&A forums. In doing so, we
start to understand what kind of ethical and political paradigms reputation systems are likely to embody
and enact.
Reputation systems in trading/transactional sites
There is a substantial existing body of research into the features and impact of reputation systems in
platforms intended to support online commerce. For example, there have been several studies of the
auction/market platform eBay’s reputation system and the impact it has on participation in the system
(see, for example, Cabral and Hortaçsu, 2010; Dellarocas, et al., 2004; Houser and Wooders, 2006; Hui,
et al., 2014; Resnick, et al., 2000; Resnick and Zeckhauser, 2002; Resnick, et al., 2006). The main
findings of this research suggest that feedback contributions on eBay are not strongly driven by altruism
(Dellarocas, et al., 2004), and instead are more strongly driven by an expectation of reciprocity, in what
is clearly an example of a (cyborg) practice that has emerged through the facilitation of the reputation
system. In further examples of (cyborg) practices, Resnick, et al. (2000) suggest that users not only
reciprocate but also retaliate. They also suggest that users of the site become less likely to participate in
the feedback process once they have accumulated experience (and “respectable” reputation scores). This
observation is consistent with the suggestion that users’ participation in the feedback process is not
strongly driven by altruism, as it may imply that once users have built up a secure reputation, they no
longer feel the need to elicit ratings from others by providing ratings themselves. Resnick, et al. (2006)
showed that reputation is, however, important, and that the same items, sold by the same seller under
two different identities, attracted an eight percent lower price when sold through a newly-established
identity with low reputation, as compared to the seller’s “real” (well-established, high reputation) identity.
These findings show that reputation systems have an important role in the construction of the (cyborg)
identities of successful and unsuccessful, and hence “good” and “bad,” sellers.
Cabral and Hortaçsu (2010) studied the impact of negative feedback, finding that the first time a seller
receives negative ratings/feedback has a more significant impact on his/her sales than subsequent
negative ratings, but also that once a seller receives a negative rating, they are much more likely to
receive more. They also found that sellers with low reputations are more likely to exit the system. Thus
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the association of users with particular (cyborg) identities — in this case, the “bad” seller — can result in
a kind of emergent amplification or downward spiral.
Reputation systems have also become fundamental components of platforms facilitating the gig economy,
in which gig workers offer services in a freelance capacity. AirTasker (http://airtasker.com), for example,
has a reputation system that may be particularly important when users are seeking workers (called
Taskers) who may carry out tasks in their homes, such as repairs, cleaning, or babysitting. AirTasker’s
reputation system is, from the user’s point of view, almost identical to the ones they will be familiar with
on eBay etc. (we don’t know if the algorithm is exactly the same). Reputation scores are displayed using
a five-star scale, calculated based on sub-scales provided through an exit survey and accompanied by
free text comments. These efforts to establish trustworthiness are supplemented by steps taken to verify
identity (steps which are as likely to give the platform itself more trustworthiness as individual Taskers).
The effect of the sociotechnical assemblage is to clearly position human labor as a marketable
commodity: as Taskers have to bid for jobs, having a high reputation score will increase their market
access capacity and potential economic value. However, the reputation system seems to co-create a
(cyborg) practice of almost universally positive feedback: every AirTasker is reviewed as wonderful (or
not reviewed at all). This may reflect constraint on the part of those giving feedback, whether out of
politeness or for some other motive, or the possible removal from the assemblage of Taskers who do not
maintain a five-star average (as happens on many other gig-type platforms such as the transport-
arranging site Lyft.com).
AirTasker is a relatively demure gig-worker platform, positioning itself as a place where you can find a
reliable cleaner or baby-sitter. Taking the example of Fiverr (http://fiverr.com), we see again a reputation
system that is based on the same features as those operating in platforms on which goods are traded.
However, Fiverr’s reputation system is made more complicated by the use of a “perks” system. This
means that reputation buys not only higher levels of potential trust among users, but also actual
increases in services provided by the platform. One possible result of this is that users with low
reputations — likely to be those who have only recently joined the site, or those who do not use it very
often — are penalized, while those who have stayed “loyal” to the site and sell many of their services
through it get preferential treatment. This is reminiscent of the use of points in online games, which
incentivize continued play by linking points to the ability to unlock additional game features. Thus Fiverr’s
reputation system not only contributes to the positioning of human labor as a commodity, but also
simultaneously positions workers as game-players.
The tone of text from both sellers and customers on Fiverr also points to some important consequences of
treating human time, labor and reputation entirely as commodities. Fiverr gig-workers offer to do almost
anything (recent offers include “I will sing Happy Birthday dressed as Tin Foil Man in a thong”) and Fiverr
customers leave rather unconstrained reviews compared to those on AirTasker. Thus it seems that in the
sociotechnical assemblage of Fiverr, which positions itself as rather youthful and hip, the reputation
system co-constitutes a (cyborg) practice of judgmentality, and encourages customers to treat service
providers as commodities or goods that can not only be bought and sold, but also categorized in relation
to quality. At the same time, providers’ (cyborg) identities emerge as available, flexible, there to be
commanded, and cheap — to the point where dignity is a potential barrier to success.
Reputation systems also afford practices that may subvert the original intentions or inscriptions of the
designers, in order to allow different constructions of (cyborg) identities. Reputation systems, especially
in e-commerce platforms, seek to discourage cheating and manipulation. However the very design of
these systems offers affordances for malicious users to tamper with their own reputation or those of
others in order to obtain illegal or prohibited advantages. As reputation, in these services, is an asset that
may facilitates custom and drives people to purchases, unscrupulous participants may find ways to
artificially increase their reputation scores to increase custom, or to lure customers into potentially
fraudulent transactions. Equally, participants may try to damage the reputation of others, leading to the
loss of custom for the targeted user and possibly increase in custom for a rival. Reputation manipulation,
afforded by the reputation system as part of a sociotechnical assemblage, can thus undermine the
capacity of these systems to generate and sustain healthy trust relations. These manipulations and their
effects may also be seen as resulting from the computer-mediated nature of these trust building systems,
which operate by proxy for far away actors and organizations. Clearly, a manipulated reputation is also a
process of (cyborg) identity-building.
Reputation systems in expert Q&A sites
We turn now to briefly explore reputation systems in expert Q&A sites, using the example of
StackOverflow. StackOverflow is a Q&A site where programmers can ask and answer questions relating to
technical issues; it has probably the best-known and most elaborately-developed reputation system in a
Q&A site (Bosu, et al., 2013; Hart and Sarma, 2014; Movshovitz-Attias, et al., 2013). In StackOverflow’s
reputation system, users can up-vote and down-vote questions and answers provided by others, actions
that not only contribute to reputation-building but also move questions up and down in terms of the order
of display, and so make them more or less visible. Users gain and lose reputation in a variety of ways,
including through the up- and down-voting of questions; there are many more ways to gain reputation
than to lose it. The most significant way to lose reputation points involuntarily is if a post is flagged as
offensive or spam; points can also be “spent” (transferred to another user) in a bounty system for those
seeking quick and accurate answers to complex or esoteric questions.
In StackOverflow, points are converted into privileges: for example once a user has 15 points, they can
vote up a question or answer; once they have, 20, they can talk in a chat; once they have 125, they can
vote down questions or answers; and so on. At 1,500 points users are allowed to add new tags to the site
(questions are tagged as corresponding to particular topic areas, such as SQL or Java); at 2,000, users
can edit other users’ questions and answers. At 10,000 points users gain moderation rights; at 25,000,
they have access to the site’s analytics. Thus there are incentives to build one’s reputation that go
beyond the acquisition of reputation for its own sake, or in order to gain the trust of other users.
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However, this reputation system is still grounded in an individualistic, accumulative and competitive
paradigm, which may have negative consequences for the diffusion of professional knowledge. For
example, Movshovitz-Attias, et al. (2013) found that while the majority of questions on the site were
posted by novice users with low reputations, on average higher reputation users ask more questions than
lower reputation users, simply because they contribute more often to the site. StackOverflow has also
been found to (unintentionally) exclude or discourage female participants (Vasilescu, et al., 2012), which
has been partially attributed to the reward system. Thus StackOverflow’s reputation system contributes
to the emergence of (cyborg) practices around how quickly and how often users both ask questions and
provide answers, in ways that may to some extent undermine its aims and ethos.
Discourses
Turning to the last of Introna’s four figuration agencies, we examine some of the current discourses
around online reputation.
The notion of online reputation has received substantial attention in recent years, with some authors
suggesting that the increasing digitization of transactions and interactions is leading to a “reputation
society” (Masum and Tovey, 2011) and others proposing that reputation is in fact social capital in a
“reputation economy” (Gandini, 2016).
As evident from the descriptions above, online reputation systems have been developed for two general
purposes: as tools to help users of Web-based platforms make decisions about whom to trust; and as
motivators for more and higher quality participation in certain Web-based activities or communities (and
correspondingly as disincentives for unwanted behaviors). Such systems are based on the premise that
‘reputation becomes visible, tangible and, under certain conditions, even measurable ... through
algorithms and metrics that elaborate online reputation scores’ [13].
Some authors suggest that this kind of measurement and sharing of reputation information could
radically shift the balance of power in society, as ‘peer networks will confer legitimacy on people
emerging from the grassroots’ [14]. However, one might ask whether reputation systems as currently
developed are more likely to reinforce self-interested individualism, since they are grounded in
methodological individualism which sees social groups as aggregations of individuals, each aiming at self-
satisficing egoistic behavior, under the often not explicit idea that this is done for the benefit of the whole
group. As Adam Smith famously stated, ‘It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the
baker that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own self-interest’ [15].
Some aspects of these discourses around the power of digital reputation appear to have been taken to
extremes in the (nominally socialist) Chinese government’s recent experiments with and planned national
roll-out of a combined social and personal-financial credit system (Botsman, 2017; Hvistendahl, 2017). In
these, conventional measures of financial credit-worthiness are being combined with behavioral metrics
including shopping habits, friendship networks and the sharing of ‘positive energy’ (Botsman, 2017)
online to produce a single trustworthiness or social credit score.
Representing an alternative, more critical discourse, one episode of the TV series Black Mirror, Nosedive
[16], takes the idea of ubiquitous reputation systems to the extreme; in so doing, it powerfully illustrates
some of the political implications of reputation systems and their capacity to be the driver of social
exclusion and inclusion. In it, people use an app on their mobile phone to rate each other during or after
any real interaction. In a plot move that has echoes of the developing Chinese social credit system
(Botsman, 2017; Hvistendahl, 2017), those with high scores have access to better apartments and other
perks. On the other hand, those with low scores become social outcasts. This reputation system, then,
constitutes an instrument for both upward and downward social mobility. Similarly to the low bridges
described by Winner, the reputation system in Nosedive embodies a politics with rules of exclusion and
inclusion which are enacted through and by the artefact.
Disclosing the ethico-political agency of reputation systems: trust and reputation as forms of
capital
The characteristics of conventional reputation systems made apparent above are summarized in Table 1.
 
Table 1: Figuration agencies of reputation systems.
Figuration agencies Some examples
Affordances/prohibitions
Acquisition/loss of reputation — reputation ‘wealth’
and ‘poverty’
Rating people, as well as goods and services, for
‘quality’ — awarding stars, writing feedback,
passing judgment
Encourages behaviors for which points are
awarded, such as promptness, low price,
reliability; discourages behaviors that deviate from
the norm.
Often removes the possibility of explanation for
poor reputation (scores)
Removes need for criticality and complex
judgments
Self-fulfilling/self-reinforcing (upward and
downward spirals)
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(Cyborg) identities Constructs identities of “good” platform users, e.g.,
 seller — popular, many interactions
gig-economy worker — flexible available, cheap
buyer — gives feedback on every interaction
expert — quickest to answer, frequent contributor
Novice — should keep quiet and not venture
opinions until reputation has grown.
(Cyborg) practices
Immediate feedback
Constrained feedback — in response to pre-
determined categories, and a reluctance to write
negative reviews (every transaction is marvelous)
Unconstrained feedback — under the cover of
anonymity, fake ids and distance
Reciprocation, retaliation, collusion
Competition and attacks
Dominance and lurking (peripheral participation)
Creation of notion that it is normal and indeed
expected to rate people, as well as goods and
services or the perceived quality of their
knowledge
Creation of reliance on the opinions of others
rather than the exercise of judgment or the explicit
taking of risks
Discourses
Commoditization of reputation
Reputation as (social) capital
Interaction partners as vendors and customers
 
By disclosing these figuration agencies, we begin to understand what sort of politics may be embodied in
conventional reputation system designs, and to see how this is re-inscribed back into online communities.
These systems appear to be based on individualism, the free market as the ideal (political) economy and
liberalism as the essence of social relations. For example, Dellarocas, one of the most influential theorists
of these type of systems, states that ‘[t]he new platforms may be all about harnessing crowds and
communities, but in the end, those crowds and communities are nothing but a sum of individuals’ [17], a
position that neglects the sometimes strong and complex social, political and cultural mechanisms that
couple individuals and result in emergent, collective behavior. Similarly, Picci (2007) explicitly positions
his arguments as rooted in rational choice theory, positing that ‘individual social actors act to advance
their self-interest’ and claiming that reputation systems ‘allow selection forces to weed out the least fit’.
Gandini’s claim that reputation is social capital rests on the belief that it is ‘an eminently economic
concept’ [18] that ‘functions as a form of currency enabling trust among strangers’ [19] and that is ‘a
resource that may be mobilized and that remains with the individual ... as a capital that is invested,
traded or managed ... as an investment in social relations with expected economic return’ [20], a view
that combines individualism with a clear commoditization of reputation.
However, if reputation is viewed as a currency or marketable commodity, resulting from action of self-
interested individuals, then it may be exposed to the same risks and problems that arise in financial
markets, including questions related to ownership, fairness and control. Indeed, the global financial crisis
has led to renewed questions as to the validity of competitive, free-market models and suggestions that
approaches that recognize the strong coupling of different components in the system should be developed
(Helbing and Kirman, 2013). Within the economics of reputation and trust that reputation systems are
helping to create, there is already evidence for the kind of problems that arise when financial gain can be
made by adopting certain behaviors, including the use of multiple or fake personas to acquire undeserved
reputational credit/value, exaggerated reciprocity, individualized reciprocity resulting in clique formation,
retaliation and clique-based attacks. As early as 2007, an ENISA report (Carrara and Hogben, 2007),
listed 15 potential threats to the generation of trust through reputation systems, including among others
the Sybil attack, whitewashing, ballot stuffing and collusion. For example in the collusion threat/attack,
several malicious users collude together to boost the potential reputation associated with one or more
accounts. As this reputation then is inflated by fabricated positive ratings given by colluders, it could be
used to lure customers attracted by the high reputation of a seller, only to defraud them subsequently.
Collusion is per se a process which is afforded by the design of rating systems, where multiple unknown
people’s ratings contribute to build a reputation score. We often hear in the news about another potential
threat, namely extortion and/or bad-mouthing. This is the case when there are single individuals, or more
organized campaigns (which would amount again to collusion), which operate for the purpose of
blackmailing or producing unfairly negative ratings for a user which could easily lead to a loss of
reputation or loss of custom. Moreover, this could also lead to difficulties for the target user for regaining
the original reputation. This is known to be an issue in websites such as Tripadvisor [21] or other leisure
review Web sites, where the service has a procedure in place for e.g., hotel owner to report that. It is
also known that there are crowdsourcing services which offer unscrupulous sellers ways to boost their
reputation (Xu, et al., 2015) or damage the reputation of others. Bots have also been linked with
manipulation of reputation and to an automated production of scores, which are not reflective of actual
behavior and thus (cyborg) identity of participants (De Paoli, 2013). Reputation systems, then, may not
only enact a market-based, accumulative and acquisitive capitalist paradigm in whatever digital spaces
they are employed — but also risk introducing behaviors that are detrimental to the health and
sustainability of those spaces.
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Implications for platforms intended to foster non-competitive, non-individualistic interactions
and behaviors
While a market-based view of reputation may be acceptable and even desirable in a business-focused
trading site, it may undermine the intentions and purported values of other types of site. For example,
although expert Q&A sites could be viewed as markets for knowledge, with competition among providers
to supply the best quality knowledge, they are not real markets in the sense that there is no obvious cost
to those seeking (and presumably consuming) the knowledge on offer and knowledge-providers retain the
knowledge that they give out. Instead, a closer comparison might be with school or university learning
environments, or sites of professional learning, where knowledge, once created, can be distributed and
shared at no loss to any party to the sharing transaction. Rather than the power dynamics of a market,
governed by competition and differentiation in wealth, expert Q&A sites are more likely to be
characterized by dynamics of pride and commitment to the advancement and promotion of particular
forms of knowledge and skill. In this kind of context, reputation might still take the form of something to
be accumulated, but not so much at the expense of other actors competing for the same resources and
capital.
Some of the implications for the inclusion of reputation systems in sociotechnical assemblages not
intended to facilitate commercial transactions or operate on a platform capitalist basis can already be
seen in existing platforms. As stated above, reputation systems are increasingly being included in
platforms that have quite different intended functions. Systems based on the same principles are also
increasingly being incorporated into digital spaces that indeed set out to bypass commercial transactions
and achieve cooperative or mutualistic transactions. For example, the accommodation-arranging platform
Couchsurfing.com positions itself as setting out to achieve a social good: ‘We envision a world made
better by travel and travel made richer by connection. Couchsurfers share their lives with the people they
encounter, fostering cultural exchange and mutual respect’ (Couchsurfing, 2016). Couchsurfing.com relies
on substantial levels of trust between strangers, as users share their homes with each other without any
monetary exchange.
Lauterbach, et al. (2009) showed that there are significant levels of both direct and generalized
reciprocity within the overall couchsurfing community. Couchsurfing’s reputation system is based on
systems used in conventional economic trading sites but has two unusual features. The first is in its use
of friendship ties. Users can identify the type of relationship they have with other users, choosing from:
Haven’t met yet, Acquaintance, CouchSurfing friend, Friend, Good friend, Close friend, and Best friend.
Thus the reputation system contributes to the construction of distinct (cyborg) identities in which
friendship is categorized and graded. Couchsurfers who have hosted or stayed with other members are
permitted to submit private feedback (to Couchsurfing) and public references for 14 days after a stay.
Members must have a couch request with the “Yes” “Maybe” or “Confirmed” status in order to leave a
Surf/Host reference. Other members may create references under the “Other” or “Friend” reference
designations (as opposed to “Surf” or “Host”). Users’ publicly visible reputation information is simply the
number of references they have been given, and the number of those that are positive and have been
confirmed (i.e., the user has confirmed the host/guest exchange). Other users can see free text
references left by former guests/hosts. All of these affordances and prohibitions contribute to the creation
of possible (cyborg) practices.
It seems that this qualification of feedback based on the nature of relationships may be an attempt to
mitigate the pure free-market nature of a conventional ratings-based system, in which every opinion
counts the same, no matter how well-informed. However, this reputation system remains at heart
accumulative and judgmental, and constructs the (cyborg) identity of ‘good host’ in ways very similar to
the construction of ‘good seller’ on trading sites. Couchsurfing has a second unusual feature, which offers
another example of how a reputation system can undermine the stated ethos of a platform. After some
years of operating with the system described above, Couchsurfing.com introduced an additional
“vouching” system, to allow some users to increase their reputation levels. This very restrictive system
allows users to vouch for other users only if they have received three or more “vouches” themselves,
effectively restricting vouching to an elite core: in, 2009, only 6.8 percent of members were able to vouch
(Lauterbach, et al., 2009). The affordances and prohibitions associated with vouching seem to have
created both new (cyborg) practices (vouching and exaggerated reciprocation) and new (cyborg)
identities (an elite). Thus the use of a conventional reputation system — albeit with some modifications —
may in fact represent a misalignment with Couchsurfing’s stated values of opening up sociocultural
spaces and recognizing the contribution to this endeavor made by anyone who is willing to open up their
home to a stranger.
Another sociotechnical context in which conventional reputation systems may not align with designers
and users intentions and values is the supportive discussion forum. On the surface, such forums may
seem to be similar to the expert Q&A forums considered in the previous section — discussion boards to
which users can post questions that they are seeking answers to from community members with similar
interests, pre-occupations and lived experiences. However, there are some fundamental differences to the
aims and use of such sites which may have profound implications for any kind of trust facilitation system.
First, expert Q&A sites such as StackOverflow are professional/technical interest community sites. Their
users tend to be people who already have some degree of technical expertise (and therefore knowledge
and cultural capital) and are seeking more. Several things follow from this:
Questions on sites such as StackOverflow are technical in nature, seeking specific solutions to
specific coding, implementation or operating system problems.
They are likely to have answers which can be clearly judged as right, wrong or useful, depending on
whether these answers lead to solutions that the questioner (and other members of the community)
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can implement. Where there may be more than one correct answer/workable solution, some will be
more efficient or simpler to implement than others, and can be judged better on those grounds.
Because users have some existing level of expertise, their judgment as to the value of answers
might be expected to be reasonably reliable.
Users are often enthusiasts for their work, and so are discussing something they enjoy doing. They
are also proud of their expertise and are keen to provide answers if they have them.
Questions (and answers) on sites such as StackOverflow are almost never personal or emotional;
they are rarely likely to be of dramatic importance to the questioner’s life or living conditions.
In contrast, the stories that may be told, and the advice and guidance sought and given on community
support discussion forums, for example relating to health issues or financial problems, may relate to
issues which are of substantial personal significance to users. There are many such communities, some
facilitated by charities, health systems, or other authoritative figures or structures, but others having a
more grass roots or community-driven character (see, for example, Barak, et al., 2008; Chung, 2013).
Many are associated with particular illnesses, whether physical or mental (see, for example, Eysenbach,
et al., 2004; Griffiths, et al., 2009; Wright and Bell, 2003). Some discussion forums and mailing lists
have developed to provide a safe space for minority groups such as the LGBTQI community (Mehra, et
al., 2004). Others provide discussion forums for larger groups, a good example being the parenting forum
Mumsnet (Pedersen and Smithson, 2013).
While reputation scores are not yet widespread among such sites, they have found their way into some of
them. For example, the set of discussion forums hosted by the platform supportgroups.com, which
includes forums dedicated to financial problems, homelessness, anxiety, and other mental and physical
health issues, has a linked reputation system so that users can acquire points for contributing across the
forums they are enrolled in. The use of reputation systems in digital spaces that might attract vulnerable,
socially-isolated or excluded people may be of particular concern. There is a well-established correlation
between ill-health or social exclusion and depression/anxiety (see, for example, Belle Doucet, 2003;
Galea, et al., 2007; Murali and Oyebode, 2004; Murphy and Athanasou, 1999; Paul and Moser, 2009;
Vinokur, et al., 1996), which is not surprising given the potential for experiences of precariousness, social
exclusion and social isolation, and feelings of inadequacy and decreasing hope. While people may well
have positive stories and strategies to share, they may often be describing how they overcame a difficulty
that was quite an unpleasant experience. Similarly, those visiting the site in order to find help and advice
may well be seeking the emotional, as well as practical, support that can be provided by a community of
people experiencing similar difficulties. We might speculate on the potential impact of inscribing a
capitalist-oriented reputation system into such an environment. While on the one hand users might value
trust creation processes as they decide who to interact with and seek support from, it is easy to imagine
situations in which reputation scores might have negative impacts, for example on users’ self-esteem.
Given the value-system inherent in the design of conventional reputation systems, reputation may
represent another form of capital in which users can find themselves to be poor, and so another
benchmark of failure, inadequacy and inequity.
In all the above examples of existing systems, reputation is effectively reduced to a commodity —
something that can be accumulated and lost, for which there exists a competitive market, and which is
highly individualized. Given that the desired purposes of sociotechnical assemblages in which reputation
systems act are extremely varied and may be intended to create and maintain a healthy knowledge
ecosystem or provide a supportive community of peers, introducing such a capitalism of reputation may
be counterproductive. Trust is likely to be important in facilitating and encouraging interactions on such
community-focused, supportive platforms, and some kind of trust facilitation or reputation system may
well be needed; however our disclosive archaeology of the ethico-political agency of conventional
reputation systems suggest the need for a novel approach, which is not based on individualistic principles.
From the evidence available from studies of mutual cooperation sites such as couchsurfing.com, it seems
that, as Introna (2014) warns, attempts to regulate the impact of conventionally-designed reputation
systems by making small alterations are insufficient. Rather, what is needed is an approach that
reinforces relationality and community cooperation. We therefore suggest there is a real need to rethink
online trust and reputation, starting from a rejection of individualism and the notion of reputation as a
form of capital, and turning to systems that valorize cooperation and mutualistic acts that increase the
quality and strength of the assemblage as a whole. 
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